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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 2 November 1950
To : 8 November 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
9 November 1950

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

No. 14

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no indications of the probability of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. It cannot be conclusively determined whether the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is intended only to halt the U.N. advance or whether it is in preparation for offensive operations. However, increasing evidence of a build-up of Chinese Communist military strength in Northeast China indicates a growing offensive capability and Communist propaganda in favor of active military support of the North Koreans indicates psychological preparation for large-scale intervention. Chinese actions thus far indicate a Communist decision to assume a greater risk of war.
- c. There are no indications of Chinese Communist intentions to invade Indo-China or of an imminent Viet Minh offensive against the Red River delta area.
- d. Chinese Communist military conquest of Tibet without further attempts at negotiation now appears probable.
- e. There are no further indications of accelerated military preparations in Communist Europe or of other actions which would suggest any new Soviet aggression in the immediate future. Continuation of the Communists' intensive "peace" propaganda indicates sustained efforts to block or retard Western rearmament.

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2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA.--No new Chinese Communist units have been firmly identified in Korea, and the strength of Chinese units in contact is estimated at 34,500. There have been additional encounters with Soviet-type jet fighter aircraft based on Manchurian airfields, but there is no information as to the nationality of the pilots. There are further reports of a heavy movement of Chinese Communist troops in China towards the Northeast and of defensive preparations in Manchuria. Recent Chinese Communist propaganda has stated that Chinese volunteers are fighting in Korea and that the Chinese people must assist Korea in crushing the American invasion. Soviet and Eastern European propaganda also implies that the Chinese are committed to the waging of unofficial war in Korea. The Chinese Communists have made no reference to protection of the Yalu River hydroelectric installations but there are indications that the Communists are dismantling and removing some of this equipment.
 - b. INDO-CHINA.--There are no indications of a Chinese Communist intention to invade Indo-China or of a Viet Minh offensive in the Delta area in the immediate future.
 - c. TIBET.--Press reports indicate that Chinese Communist troops have begun to enter Tibet proper. The Chinese rejection of Indian protests, the Chinese demand that Indian troops withdraw from Tibet, and the decision of the Tibetans to cease attempts at further negotiation also indicate that the Chinese are proceeding with the military conquest of Tibet.
 - d. EUROPE.--No unusual military activity of Soviet or Satellite forces has been reported. Some increased Soviet deployment of AA at strategic points in Eastern Germany and Austria has been noted but no marked trend towards accelerated air defense is evident. Soviet proposals for Four-Power discussions on Germany represent no new policy on Germany.
 - e. U.S.S.R.--Indications that the U.S.S.R. has begun the demobilization of another class of NCO's in Europe, an absence of indications of unusual Soviet precautionary measures, and the tone of recent Soviet statements, emphasizing "peace" and denouncing Western rearmament, all tend to suggest that the U.S.S.R. is endeavoring to create the impression that it will not initiate additional aggressive undertakings concurrent with the Chinese intervention in Korea.
3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--Chinese Communist capabilities for offensive operations in Korea are increasing. There was no other apparent significant change during the period.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
8 November 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. Chinese Communist military activity in Korea during the past week provided little new indication of their immediate objectives. No new Chinese Communist units were firmly identified in Korea, and air opposition continued on a small scale although including additional appearances of the latest type Soviet jet fighter. Additional reports confirm that a heavy northward movement of Chinese Communist troops is under way and that air defense measures have been undertaken in Manchuria. The major new development was the marked increase of Communist propaganda supporting the Chinese Communist actions in Korea.

- (1) Chinese Communist units definitely identified in Korea are the 124th Division (42d Army), and the 54th, 55th and 56th units which are made up of troops from the 38th, 39th and 40th Chinese Communist Armies respectively. The latter units are now reported to be of division strength (about 9,000 troops) and the total Chinese Communist strength in Korea is estimated at 34,500. Prisoners have reported the presence of other Chinese Communist units and a further reinforcement cannot be discounted, but to date there is no firm evidence of the movement of additional Chinese units across the Yalu or of the transfer of Chinese army headquarters into Korea. Although a general enemy withdrawal from contact with United Nations forces appeared under way on 7 - 8 November, aerial observation indicated heavy vehicular movement from the Manchurian border.
- (2) Within the past week enemy aircraft have appeared over North Korea in increasing numbers and the identification of the MIG-15 (Soviet sweptback wing jet fighter) has been accepted. These jet fighters have apparently in all cases been based on airfields in Manchuria and in most cases have broken off engagements with U. N. fighter aircraft. There is no information as to whether the increase in enemy air capabilities is a result of the build-up of the North Korean Air Force, or the entry of the Chinese Communist Air Force, a "volunteer" Air Force or Soviet Air Force personnel. There is some doubt that the North Koreans have enough qualified pilots to operate a large number of aircraft. Previous evidence of the training of Chinese Communist pilots

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in jet aircraft indicates the possibility that planes operating from the Manchurian side of the border may be from the Chinese Communist Air Force. While it is possible that the U.S.S.R. might be utilizing its own fighter units, there is no evidence of active Soviet participation or of the movement of Soviet fighter units into Manchuria.

- (5) There are further reports to confirm the indications last week of a considerable Chinese Communist troop movement through North China towards Manchuria and northward from South China and East China. Although the movement from the latter two areas (involving elements of the Third and Fourth Field Armies) cannot be directly traced into Manchuria, the traffic is headed northward and may be destined for Manchuria, and elements of the First Field Army are apparently moving into Manchuria from the Northwest. Available information indicates that a northward troop movement from the South and East China areas has been under way for the past month and that it was apparently accelerated in late October, when there were sudden departures of artillery and anti-aircraft from Canton. Although few new units have yet been identified in Manchuria, almost all recent information points to a heavy and accelerated build-up of Chinese Communist strength in Northeast China. Additional reports have also been received of air defense preparations in Manchuria and of evacuation of civilians, schools and factories from Mukden.

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- (6) The most significant development of the past several days has been the shift in the Chinese Communist propaganda line on Korea to one of open statements that the Chinese will fight in support of the Koreans, a call for volunteers to fight with the North Korean Army, and finally an admission on 7 November that Chinese "volunteers" are fighting in Korea. At the same time, charges that the American "imperialists" are seeking to conquer all of Asia and that China is in danger have been much intensified. A joint communique issued on 4 November by the Chinese Communist Party and various other political parties stated that the situation in Korea is a direct threat to the safety of China and that the Chinese people are obligated to assist Korea

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and to resist the American invasion "by crushing it." Over half of all material currently monitored from Chinese Communist radios is on the subject of support for Korea and the defeat of the imperialists. Open Communist acceptance of responsibility for the fate of North Korea has also become apparent in statements from Moscow and Eastern Europe in the past few days. All Soviet speakers on the 7 November anniversary of the Russian Revolution identified the Korean struggle with the cause of Communism and reiterated that the United States "has passed from preparation for aggression to open aggression." Statements from Warsaw and Prague on the anniversary contained the themes that China had assumed "the sacred duty of opposing American activity in Korea" and that "only a madman could think that the Soviet people, China and their supporters all over the world would let the North Koreans down." The contrast of these statements with Communist Party efforts only a few weeks ago to play down the question of intervention in Korea is striking. Although there is still no indication from Communist statements of a formal Chinese intervention, the unreserved nature of the propaganda implies an intent to turn the tide in Korea through an unofficial war by the Chinese Communists.

- (5) It is further noteworthy that there has been almost no reference in Chinese Communist statements to indicate that their objective is the protection of the hydroelectric installations on the Korean-Manchurian border. These plants are not only an important source of power to the Chinese Communists, but the Soviet-occupied city of Dairen obtains almost two-thirds of its power supply from the Yalu River plants and the other Korean installations are a major source of power for Soviet industry in the Vladivostok-Voroshilov area. A loss or reduction of power from Korea would have a serious adverse effect on industrial production in the Soviet Maritime Territory as well as Manchuria. The continuing lack of Communist statements that their objective is limited to the protection of this power supply therefore suggests that the objective in Korea is a larger one and important enough even to risk the damage of these installations by air attack. There are, however, some indications that the Chinese Communists are attempting to dismantle and remove some of the machinery from the plants in North Korea.

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- (6) From all available information, it still cannot be determined conclusively whether the objective of the Chinese Communists is to tie down U. N. forces in Korea for an indefinite period or whether they are making preparations for an offensive to attempt to drive the U.N. forces out of Korea. The scale of the Chinese military build-up in Northeast China, however, is indicative of a growing military capability beyond any apparent defensive needs, and the increasing belligerency of Chinese propaganda also indicates the beginnings of a campaign to prepare their people for continuing if not augmented support of the North Korean Communists. The risk of war which the Chinese have assumed further raises the question of what commitment the U.S.S.R. may have made to China and at what point the U.S.S.R. would come to her aid, particularly if air attacks on Chinese territory should be made. At present, there are no clear indications of what the Soviet reaction would be, although the U.S.S.R. has in recent weeks made specific reference to the Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty.

b. In Indo-China, there have been indications from interrogations of Viet Minh prisoners that the Chinese Communist training program was directed towards jungle and mountain warfare and that this emphasis may in part have accounted for Viet Minh unpreparedness to exploit recent successes by an immediate drive into the Red River delta area. Should the Viet Minh require several months for further training and re-equipment while French and Vietnamese strength is also being built up in Tonkin, it is possible that the Chinese Communists will undertake relatively large-scale incorporation of their forces into the Viet Minh Army or will invade openly to counter-balance an increase in French strength. At present, however, there continues to be no definite indication of such an intention by the Chinese Communists. The movement of Chinese Communist troops and supplies northward from South China may indicate that active support to the Viet Minh will be decreased but such a trend is not yet apparent.

c. Reports of the progress of the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet during the past week have been almost entirely from press sources and are not confirmed. These reports indicate, however, that the Chinese drive is proceeding by a two-pronged attack from the east and northeast and that the northern column may have reached the town of Nagchu Dzong in Tibet proper. Reports of continuing advances, together with the stiff tone of the Chinese Communist note rejecting the Indian protest, the demand that India withdraw its small troop garrisons from Tibet, and the decision of the Tibetans not to proceed to Peiping in view of the Chinese Communist attitude, all would indicate that there are no further prospects of a peaceful settlement and that the military conquest of Tibet is proceeding.

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d. There have been no significant new Communist developments in Southeast Asia. The threatened Huk attacks in the Philippines have not occurred on any large scale, but there is a continuing possibility of such action.

e. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There continue to be no conclusive indications as to whether the Chinese Communist action in Korea is intended to stalemate the U.N. advance or whether it is in preparation for offensive operations. However, increasing evidence of a build-up of Chinese Communist military strength in China in the Northeast indicates a growing offensive capability, and Communist propaganda in favor of active support of North Korea may indicate psychological preparation for large-scale intervention. Whatever the ultimate Chinese action may be, present indications are that the Chinese have reached a decision with full realization of the risk of war involved.
- (2) There are no current indications that the Chinese Communists are preparing to invade Indo-China or that the Viet Minh are preparing for a full-scale offensive in the Delta area in the immediate future.
- (3) A Chinese Communist military conquest of Tibet without further attempts at negotiation now appears probable.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. All available information continues to indicate no abnormal Soviet or Satellite military activity in Communist Europe and there have been no recent reports of any marked acceleration of military preparations. It is believed that the bulk of Soviet troops in Germany and Austria have returned to winter barracks. No new military developments have been observed in Hungary, and the new Soviet depots in the Budapest area have not been the scene of any unusual activity. A possible increase in Polish military preparations has been noted, including increased military guards on bridges, an apparent rather rapid construction of a new railroad bridge across the Vistula at Grudziadz (near the Baltic Coast) and receipt of new trucks by the Polish Army, but no major military developments are apparent. There has been no new military information from Rumania and Bulgaria during the week. The Soviet-Iranian border is also quiet.

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b. There are now indications, although not entirely confirmed, that the U.S.S.R. has begun the demobilization of NCO's of the 1926 class from Germany and Austria. Some eastward troop movement from Germany by rail during late October has been reported and concurrently the movement of new troops into Germany apparently ceased. Although a net increase of about 25,000 Soviet troops in Germany has apparently occurred, it is believed that further demobilizations will offset this and that a normal troop rotation is under way. Reports from Austria support the same conclusion. There are no indications as yet that the Soviet demobilizations have included the 1927 class privates, although there have been rumors that this would occur.

c. Additional reports now indicate that an entire Soviet AAA division has been moved to Kustrin on the Oder, apparently to provide protection for important bridges on the rail and highway routes into Poland. There were previous reports that a portion of this division (which is one of the AAA divisions regularly stationed in Germany and not a new unit) had been moved into barracks at Kustrin. In Austria, additional AA guns have been stationed at a Soviet airfield, apparently assigned directly to the Soviet 2d Air Army for airfield defense; these are in addition to the equipment assigned to the AAA division in Austria. These measures reflect the continuing gradual build-up of Soviet air defense in Europe, but there have been no other reports of recent intensified air defense preparations in Eastern Europe.

d. The U.S.S.R. has formally advanced a proposal to the Western Powers that new Four-Power discussions be held on Germany. This proposal appears merely to be the anticipated continuation of the line set forth in the Prague Declaration. German Communist propaganda continues to place some emphasis on the Prague proposal for an all-German council. A recent report that the German Communists are anticipating an early withdrawal of some of the Soviet occupation forces appears only to be a recurrence of intermittent propaganda to this effect, and there continue to be no military indications that the U.S.S.R. will reduce its troop strength in Germany. Communist propaganda in Europe and the U.S.S.R. continues to emphasize "peace" and denounce Western rearmament.

e. The retention of one class of the Yugoslav Army beyond its scheduled demobilization may reflect increasing Yugoslav concern over possible military action in the Balkans, but there are otherwise no indications that the Yugoslavs are unduly apprehensive or that deteriorating economic conditions may lead to increased Soviet pressure.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. The number of Soviet ships in foreign waters continues to be relatively normal, and there are no indications of another trend towards reduction of shipping such as was evident during the summer months.

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b. The speeches of Soviet leaders on the anniversary of the Revolution, apart from the previously noted statements on Korea, contained no new themes or hints as to future Soviet aims. Marshal Bulganin's speech contained no references to a new Five-Year Plan, the prospects of an imminent economic depression in the capitalist world, or the dire consequences of a third world war. The note of exuberance and confidence which was so apparent in Malenkov's speech last year was less marked in Bulganin's speech this year. The military parade was abbreviated both in length and in amount of military equipment as compared with last year, and Stalin, Malenkov and Beriya were absent from both the evening meeting and the parade. Their whereabouts and the reasons for their absence are not known.

c. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Available intelligence does not indicate the probability of Soviet or Satellite hostilities in Europe in the immediate future, and there have been no indications of intensification of Soviet military preparations in conjunction with the Chinese intervention in Korea.
- (2) There are no indications of any change in Soviet policy. The Soviets' current policy of relative restraint may be designed in part to allay Western European fears and block or retard Western rearmament, while the Soviets steadily augment their military capabilities.

John W. Weckerling
 JOHN WECKERLING
 Brigadier General, GSC
 Chairman, Joint Intelligence
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Col R. G. Duff, G-2
Col R. E. Hommel, USMC (ONI)
Col H. H. Smith, G-2
Col B. B. Talley, G-2
Col R. F. C. Vance, JIG
Col W. E. Wilson, G-2
Cdr R. L. Taylor, USN (ONI)
Lt Cdr F. M. Murphy, USN (ONI)
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